Generated by PacketSnitch 2.3.1694 on 7/23/2026, 2:39:28 PM — packetsnitch.com

PacketSnitch's Summary

Network Analysis Summary — Consolidated Report

Executive Summary

This analysis consolidates findings from packet capture and artifact examination for a private network environment containing hosts 10.0.1.23 and 10.0.1.35. The investigation centers on a compromise involving the target host (10.0.1.23) running Hustoj (HUST Online Judge), a competitive programming platform.

The current analysis cycle expands upon previous findings with detailed examination of captured TLS/SSL encrypted traffic, identification of the password hash format, and cryptographic analysis of the encrypted session data. The encrypted traffic analysis reveals modern TLS 1.2 implementations with AEAD ciphers and suggests periodic session refresh patterns consistent with authentication token renewal.

Key Indicators of Compromise (IOC) Summary

Attribute Value
Primary Target 10.0.1.23
Secondary Host 10.0.1.35
Target Service Hustoj (HUST Online Judge)
Attack Vector ZIP archive with path traversal (../../tmp/)
Payload Type PHP webshell + Shell script + ELF binary
Protocol Confirmed HTTP/1.1 (nginx/PHP)
Server Version nginx/1.18.0 (Ubuntu)
Captured ZIP Size 566,598 bytes (~553 KB)
ZIP Entropy 8.00 (Maximum)
Extracted PHP Webshell metasploit-68d64.php (69 bytes)
Webshell Entropy 4.59 (Medium)
Session Cookie PHPSESSID=gk1icn18jtm15mbmta4c0o781m

Authentication & Session Analysis

Captured Credentials

Field Value
Username admin
Password Hash 5b8ead4a4a77c91987bbf6b442881432
Hash Format MD5 (32-byte hexadecimal)
Hash Entropy 3.65 (Low) — indicates structured/repetitive content
CSRF Token 1UFT6ubn1dsxTcZgObmaFVR6M8gjZUXc

Network Traffic Analysis Summary

Executive Overview

This analysis covers a captured network stream exhibiting encrypted TLS 1.2 communication with two distinct communication bursts approximately 60 seconds apart. The workspace was configured for HTTP protocol decoding at the time of analysis, but decoding failed, leaving only encrypted payloads available for examination.

TLS Encrypted Stream Analysis

Packet Timing and Payload Summary

Burst Timestamp Start Timestamp End Payload Pattern Interval to Keep-Alive
1 1770981216534 1770981216535 56 bytes → 76 bytes ~309ms
2 1770981276546 1770981276549 56 bytes → 76 bytes ~238ms

Key Observations:

Communication Pattern

The stream exhibits a classic client-server encrypted exchange:

  1. Client → Server: 56-byte encrypted TLS Application Data packet
  2. Server → Client: 76-byte encrypted TLS Application Data response
  3. Connection maintenance: TCP ACK/keep-alive to maintain session

The repeated 56→76 byte pattern suggests either:

Decoding Status

Workspace Configuration

Implications

The inability to decode as HTTP indicates one of the following:

Findings and Recommendations

Preserved Data Points for Reference

Category Value
TLS Version 1.2
Payload Hex Prefix 0x170303
Packet 1 Timestamp 1770981216534
Packet 2 Timestamp 1770981216535
Burst 2 Start 1770981276546
First Payload Size 56 bytes
First Response Size 76 bytes
Inter-burst Interval ~60 seconds

Recommended Next Steps

  1. Obtain TLS keys — If the traffic is expected to be HTTP/HTTPS, obtain the TLS session keys or server private key to decrypt the payloads
  2. Check for missing handshake packets — The capture may be missing ClientHello/ServerHello, preventing proper decryption