Capture Statistics

Hosts and Topology

• Both endpoints on the same VMware-virtualized /24 segment (172.16.66.0/24); no external routing.
• Service /

• SMB Decode Summary

The decoder surfaced two SMBv2/v3 packets on the wire between 172.16.66.1 and 172.16.66.36, both carrying the SESSION_SETUP command. Both completed with status 0x00000000, indicating a successful session setup handshake.

Decoded Packets

• Packet 7 (260 bytes) — Source: 172.16.66.36 — SESSION_SETUP Response (Status: 0x00000000, SMBv2/v3)
• Packet 6 (1460 bytes) — Source: 172.16.66.1 — SESSION_SETUP Request (Status: 0x00000000, SMBv2/v3)

Observations

The selected protocol is SMB and the active subtab is decodes. The request/response pair represents a clean SMB2/3 session establishment, with the client (.66.1) initiating and the server (.66.36) acknowledging without error. The structured tree view is currently empty.

• SMB Decode Summary

The workspace is on the Decodes tab with the SMB protocol selected. Out of 4 packets examined (newest first), 2 packets decoded successfully as SMBv2/v3; the other 2 did not match a known SMB protocol and produced no usable output.

Decoded SMB Traffic

• Packet 6 (1460 bytes) — Request from 172.16.66.1

  • Version: SMBv2/v3
  • Command: SESSION_SETUP
  • Status: 0x00000000

• Packet 7 (260 bytes) — Response to 172.16.66.36

  • Version: SMBv2/v3
  • Command: SESSION_SETUP
  • Status: 0x00000000

Notes

• The SESSION_SETUP request/response pair across 172.16.66.1 ↔ 172.16.66.36 completed cleanly with status 0x00000000 (success), consistent with a successful SMBv2/v3 session initialization.

• No structured tree is populated for this decode pass (structuredTree is empty), so deeper field-level inspection is not yet available.

• Conv/Data Tools Workspace Summary

Session: 2026-08-01T21:56:33Z · Active tab: Conversions · Input format: Hex

Input

• Payload (hex preview): 00 00 00 D0 6A 81 CD 30 81 CA A1 03 02 01 05 A2 03 02 01 0A A3 15 30 13 30 11 … — TLV-style ASN.1/DER structure; visible printable strings include backdoor, krbtgt, 33b, 02694W-WIN10, and 20370913024805Z (two occurrences) followed by 20200807210939Z. Contains MIC field 02 04 11 F7 EF 4A and encrypted EncTicketPart-style segment.
• Byte Length: 353 bytes

Properties

• MIME Type: application/octet-stream
• Shannon Entropy: 5.48 (Medium)
• Data Type Guesses: Base64 / Base64URL (Medium), Alphanumeric Identifier (Low)

Note: hex, ASCII, and Base64 conversion panels returned placeholder/empty results and have been suppressed per no-op policy. The payload is consistent with a Kerberos AS-REP packet (encrypted part + ticket structure referencing krbtgt/33b, SPN 02694W-WIN10, and Kerberos timestamps in 2037/2020).

• Workspace Summary — Conversions Tab

Format: Hex · Input size: 3,451 bytes · Snapshot: 2026-08-01T21:56:33Z

Input Characteristics

• Shannon Entropy: 7.84 (High) — consistent with encrypted or strongly encoded binary data.
• MIME Type (heuristic): application/javascript; charset=utf-8 — likely a false positive given the entropy and the binary-looking preview.
• Data Type Guesses:
  1. URL / Link (High)
  2. JavaScript Source Code (High)
  3. Base64URL Encoded Data (Medium)

Preview Inspection

The input preview begins with 00 00 00 D0 6A — the classic ASN.1/DER length prefix (D0 = context, constructed, 0x10) for what looks like an ASN.1 sequence, followed by an OID-style tag (6A 81 CD). Embedded readable strings inside the blob — backdoor and krbtgt — along with GeneralizedTime stamps (32 30 33 37 30 39 31 33 30 32 34 38 30 35 5A = 20370913024805Z) strongly suggest this is a Kerberos AS-REQ / TGS-REQ or ticket blob rather than the URLs or JavaScript the type-guesser suggested. The 0xFF 0x79 near the end and the principal-name 02694W-WIN10 are also characteristic of Kerberos structures.

Note on Converters

The hex, ASCII, and Base64 conversion panels show only placeholder text and produced no usable output, so they are omitted from this summary. The high-entropy preview and Kerberos-like framing are the only data points currently available from this workspace.

• Workspace: Kerberos Decode (Decodes tab)

Two Kerberos packets were decoded (newest first):

• Packet 1 (141 bytes) from 172.16.66.36: KRB-ERROR message containing an Error Code field with the timestamp value 20200807210939Z and an Error Text of 3b.
• Packet 2 (212 bytes) from 172.16.66.1: AS-REQ message (Authentication Service Request), no additional fields surfaced.

Decode context

• Protocol selected: kerberos
• Decoded table mirrors the preview: Message Type → KRB-ERROR, Error Code → 20200807210939Z, Error Text → 3b.
• Workspace timestamp: 2026-08-01T21:56:39.551Z.

Analyst note: The KRB-ERROR timestamp is unusually long (15 digits) for a standard Kerberos krbtime field — worth checking on the wire if these are hex/decimal microseconds versus a raw UTC string before relying on it as a clock-skew indicator.

Network Capture Analysis —

Capture Analysis Summary

Capture Overview

This capture is a small (15 packets, 5 streams, 11.43 KB), all-TCP, all-unencrypted trace involving two hosts on the same /24 segment: 172.16.66.1 and 172.16.66.36, both identified via VMware MAC OUI. Each host contributed 15 packets, indicating a tightly symmetric conversation. Average stream length is 3.00 packets (min 2, max 4), with no retransmissions and no out-of-order segments — the trace represents a clean, short-lived exchange.

Protocol Footprint

Two application-layer protocols surfaced from the decoded traffic:

• Kerberos (TCP/88) — authentication artifacts
• SMB (TCP/445) — file-sharing / named-pipe traffic

Ephemeral source ports observed: 49914, 50950, 50951, 50952, 50953. MIME classification for the captured payloads is dominated by application/octet-stream, with secondary data-type hints including ISO-8859 text (with and without overstriking), Non-ISO extended-ASCII, OpenPGP Public Key, and OpenPGP Secret Key signatures — a mix consistent with ASN.1/DER-encoded Kerberos blobs and SMB binary payloads.

Host & Port Inventory

MAC vendor for both endpoints: VMware, Inc. (consistent with a virtualized lab/VPN environment).

Kerberos Analysis (TCP/88)

The Kerberos-related decode surface across the capture centers on a 353-byte ASN.1/DER-framed blob with medium Shannon entropy of 5.48, classified as application/octet-stream. Structural indicators (A0–AA tag bytes, 02 01 INTEGER fields, 04 xx OCTET STRINGs, 1B xx BMP-string / GeneralString, and 18 0F GeneralizedTime) confirm a DER-encoded Kerberos message.

Notable strings surfaced from the Kerberos blob

• backdoor — embedded as a principal-component string; high-priority indicator for adversarial naming or a non-standard principal.
• krbtgt (appears twice, each with a 3b suffix) — the standard Kerberos ticket-granting service principal name.
• 02694W-WIN10 — Windows client hostname/principal, suggesting a Windows 10 endpoint labeled with a workstation-style identifier.

ASN.1 / timestamp observations

• 02 01 12 / 02 01 11 / 02 01 17 / 02 01 18 — small INTEGER fields (decimal 18, 17, 23, 24) commonly used for Kerberos

Packet Capture Analysis Summary

Capture Snapshot

The pcap is small but highly focused: 15 packets across 5 TCP streams, totaling 11.43 KB, with 0 encrypted and 0 undecodable packets. All traffic is unencrypted and confined to a single internal /24 (172.16.66.0/24, VMware virtual environment). Only two hosts are active — 172.16.66.1 and 172.16.66.36 — each contributing all 15 packets (symmetric conversation). No TCP retransmissions or out-of-order segments were observed, and stream lengths are tight (avg 3.00, min 2, max 4 packets). Decoded protocols are limited to Kerberos and SMB, with all payloads classified as application/octet-stream. Notably, the capture contains zero internet hosts, so all activity is local-to-local.

Hosts and Network Context

• 172.16.66.1 — Initiates Kerberos traffic (AS-REQ seen sourced from this host). Appears to be the client workstation.
• 172.16.66.36 — Responds with Kerberos replies, including what appears to be a KDC-side error. Likely the domain controller / KDC, possibly also the SMB endpoint.
• All traffic is intra-VM, on VMware virtual NICs, with no external routing.

The Kerberos conversation rides on port 88; SMB uses **445

PacketSnitch — Compacted Capture Summary

1. Capture Overview

The capture is a small, internally-routed exchange (15 packets, 11.43 KB, 5 streams) between two VMware-virtualized hosts on the 172.16.66.0/24 network. Every packet is unencrypted at the capture layer and rides on TCP. The only decoded L7 protocols surfaced are Kerberos and SMB, and the only MIME type identified is application/octet-stream. There are no retransmissions, no out-of-order segments, and no internet hosts touched — the entire conversation is east-west on the LAN.

2. Hosts, Ports, and Topology

Two hosts account for all 15 packets (symmetrical 15/15 split, consistent with bidirectional request/response pairs plus SMB session setup).